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I. Introduction 
 
Cases before constitutional jurisdictions are possibly one of the situations in which law 
and politics most clearly converge. Constitutional courts are political actors as much as 
legal ones,1 their members are selected by other political actors,2 and the questions upon 
which they have to adjudicate are mainly political. Cases before constitutional 
jurisdictions provide an opportunity to analyse how political goals are sought in a 
battlefield governed by legal rules. tThis gives rise to imaginative strategies of litigation 
in which claimants must learn how to mobilise the law for their own purposes and in 
which also courts have to give a constitutionally sophisticated and reasonable response 
while at the same time being prudent regarding the political questions at stake. 
 
The process of ratification of the Lisbon Treaty is an excellent example of this. Before 
the treaty was ratified, in a context of important political pressures, twelve petitions for 
its review were presented before constitutional jurisdictions across Europe.3 Analyses of 
these cases have been either entirely legal or entirely political. Legal studies have 
undertaken comparative4 or individual5 analyses in which the cases were commented on 
                                                 
1
 As assumed by literature in the field of Judicial Politics. See M. Shapiro and A. Stone Sweet, On Law 
Politics and Judicialization (Oxford University Press, 2002). 
2
 M. Volcansek, ‘Appointing judges the European way (Rethinking Judicial Selection: A Critical 
Appraisal of Appointive Selection for State Court Judges),’ (2007) 9 Fordham Urban Law Journal 363, 
367. 
3
 French CC, Case 2007-560 DC Treaty of Lisbon, decision of 20 Dec. 2007; Austrian CC, Case SV 2/08-
3 et al. Treaty of Lisbon I, order of 30 Sept. 2008; Slovenian CC, Case Ul-49/08 Treaty of Lisbon, 
judgment of 17 Oct. 2008; Czech CC, Case Pl ÚS 19/08 Treaty of Lisbon I, judgment of 26 Nov. 2008; 
Austrian CC, Case SV 1/10-9 Treaty of Lisbon II, order of 11 Mar. 2009; Belgian CC, Case 58/2009 
Treaty of Lisbon I, judgment of 19 Mar. 2009; Latvian CC, Case 2008-35-01 Treaty of Lisbon, judgment 
of 7 Apr. 2009; German BVerfG, Case 2 BvE 2/08 et al. Treaty of Lisbon, judgment of 30 Jun. 2009; 
Belgian CC, Case 125/2009 Treaty of Lisbon II, judgment of 16 Jul. 2009; Belgian CC, Case 156/2009 
Treaty of Lisbon III, judgment of 13 Oct. 2009; Czech CC, Case Pl ÚS 29/09 Treaty of Lisbon II, 
judgment of 3 Nov. 2009; Polish CT, Case K 32/09 Treaty of Lisbon, judgment of 24 Nov. 2010. Some 
other rulings on the Lisbon Treaty were issued, but since in these cases the very claims were presented 
when the process of ratification had already concluded they fall outside the scope of this article: 
Hungarian CC, Case 143/2010 (VII. 14.) Treaty of Lisbon, judgment of 12 Jul. 2010; Austrian CC, Case 
SV 1/10-9 Treaty of Lisbon III, order of 12 Jun. 2010. 
4
 M. Wendel, ‘Lisbon Before the Courts: Comparative Perspectives,’ (2011) 7 European Constitutional 
Law Review 96; K. Kruma, Constitutional Courts and the Lisbon Treaty. The future based on mutual 
trust, (Centre for European Policy Studies, 2010) online at http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-
Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=117517 
(12.06.2012). 
5
 See inter alia G. Beck, ‘The Lisbon Judgement of the German Constitutional Court, the Primacy of EU 
law and the Problem of Kompetenz-Kompetenz: A Conflict between Right and Right in Which There is 
No Praetor,’ (2011) 17 European Law Journal 470; R. Bieber, ‘An Association of Sovereign States’ 
Comments on the German Constitutional Court’s Decision on the Lisbon Treaty,’ (2009) 5 European 
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from a doctrinal perspective, focusing mainly on the relationship between the rulings 
and the legal system as well as on the legal implications of the cases. Meanwhile, the 
few political works on these rulings6 have only tried to understand the courts’ decisions 
on the merits as a result of political variables, to the almost total exclusion of legal 
considerations. This article therefore aims to construct an intermediate approach, 
capable of combining law and politics in the study of litigation strategies. Our main 
assumption is that the legal and the political coexisted in the strategies that litigants 
used to oppose the treaty before the courts, and in the responses that the courts gave to 
the litigants. Our intention is to describe such strategies without making a normative 
assessment of the legitimacy of the underlying claims of each of the actors, thus 
remaining neutral observers. As we will show, the behaviour of the actors was an 
exhibition of mastery in the art of arguing legally with political intentions. The political 
strategies of litigation and the courts’ reactions can only be understood by analysing the 
legal argumentations of both the claimants and the courts. 
 
This article is structured as follows. After this brief introduction (I), we will focus on 
the strategies used by the claimants to block the ratification of the treaty before the 
courts (II). We will show that they made clever use of legal rules of standing before the 
court in order to judicialise the process of ratification (II.A), of ‘integration clauses’ in 
national constitutions in order to question the validity of the treaty or its instruments of 
ratification (II.B), of constitutional provisions in order to underline the democratic 
deficits of the treaty at stake (II.C) and of the judicial conflicts underlying the European 
judicial dialogue (II.D). Subsequently, we will analyse the courts’ counter-arguments 
and show that behind their legal argumentation lay a clear pro-treaty stance (III); to do 
                                                                                                                                               
Constitutional Law Review 393%Ĝt]Dµ7KH&]HFK5HSXEOLF7KH&RQVWLWXWLRQDO&RXUWRQWKH/LVERQ
Treaty. Decision of 26 November 2008,’ (2009) 5 European Constitutional Law Review 143; E. Eriksen, 
and J.E. Fossum, ‘Bringing European Democracy Back In – Or How to Read the German Constitutional 
Court’s Lisbon Treaty Ruling,’ (2011) 17 European Law Journal 153; D. Grimm, ‘Defending Sovereign 
Statehood Against Transforming the European Union. Comments on the German Constitutional Court’s 
Decision on the Lisbon Treaty,’ (2009) 5 European Constitutional Law Review 353; A. Grosser, ‘The 
Federal Constitutional Court’s Lisbon Case: Germany’s “Sonderweg”: An Outsider’s Perspective,’ (2009) 
10 German Law Journal 1263; P. Kiiver, ‘The Lisbon Judgment of the German Constitutional Court: A 
Court-Ordered Strengthening of the National Legislature in the EU,’ (2010) 16 European Law Journal 
578; I. Slosarcik, ‘The Treaty of Lisbon & the Czech Constitutional Court: Act II,’ (2009) CEPS Policy 
Brief 197/27. 
6
 C. Closa and P. Castillo, ‘National Courts and Ratification of European Union Treaties,’ in T. Evas, C. 
Lord and U. Liebert (eds), Multilayered Representation in the European Union.  Parliaments, Courts and 
the Public Sphere, (Nomos, 2012), at 129; C. Closa, ‘National Higher Courts and the Ratification of EU 
Treaties’, (2013) 36 West European Politics 97. 
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so, we will analyse how their decisions on the merits cautiously avoided threats to 
ratification (III.A), how they favoured a pro-treaty interpretation of European clauses 
(III.B), how they tried to placate the fears of the claimants regarding the treaty’s threat 
to democratic elements of the polis (III.C), and how they redirected concerns regarding 
the compatibility between the treaty and their constitutions towards the question of their 
Kompetenz-Kompetenz (III.D). Finally, we will offer some brief conclusions (IV). 
 
 
II. The moves by the claimants: the litigation strategies of the opponents of 
ratification 
 
Claimants were usually opponents of ratification. As such, they saw the courts as a tool 
they could use in their political battle. Our aim in this section is simply to describe and 
better understand the strategies they followed in order to achieve their goal of blocking 
or at least slowing down ratification of the treaty. In order to do so, litigants used the 
courts and law in a variety of ways. To begin with, they used rules of standing before 
the court to judicialise the process of ratification by asking constitutional courts to 
intervene and assess the constitutionality of the Lisbon Treaty; in so doing, they brought 
one more actor – the court – into the scene. However, the judicial arena is governed by 
its own rules. Aware of this, litigants deployed a variety of tactics wherein they sought 
to achieve their political goals through legal means. Firstly, they tried to activate 
‘integration clauses’ in national constitutions for anti-ratification purposes; this apparent 
paradox demonstrates that they were ready to translate their discourse into the language 
that courts understand: the legal one. Secondly, they alleged that the Lisbon Treaty 
violated  important democratic principles, probably aware that their judicial battle was 
only part of a larger political conflict. Thirdly, they tried to exploit the tensions between 
the Court of Justice and national constitutional jurisdictions – the so-called ‘judicial 
dialogue’ – to their benefit. Of course, all these strategies were not mutually exclusive; 
rather the claimants combined them in a variety of ways. 
 
 
A. Judicialising the process of ratification 
 
 4 
The first strategy used by the opponents of ratification was judicialisation of the 
process. Judicialisation has been described as the expansion of the province of justices 
at the expense of politicians.7 This definition points to a rather interesting phenomenon: 
in participating in political affairs courts introduce legal and judicial dynamics into the 
political arena, but at the same time the object of their review brings courts into a 
scenario governed by political logics. This convergence between ‘things legal’ and 
‘things political’ is the result of the actors’ decision to activate judiciaries for political 
purposes. 
 
The claimants that judicialised the process of ratification were in general opponents of 
the Lisbon Treaty; in playing ‘the judicial card’ the opponents of ratification may have 
been tempted to try to obtain in the judicial arena what they could not get in the political 
one. By adopting this course, in the worst case scenario, they might make visible to 
public opinion a series of criticisms against the treaty and at the same time they might 
gain time by delaying ratification. In the best case scenario, they might obtain a 
declaration of unconstitutionality by the court, which might eventually block 
ratification. 
 
Out of twelve complaints, one was presented by a head of state, three were presented by 
members of parliament (MPs), and the rest were presented by citizens. In the last 
instance, opponents of ratification used the procedure of constitutional complaint and 
alleged violations of their constitutional rights by the treaty. However, this is not to say 
that constitutional complaints were always initiated by ordinary anonymous citizens. 
For instance, in the famous Lissabon-Urteil ruling the German court was also activated 
through a constitutional complaint8 even though political actors were among the 
petitioners.9 When MPs presented complaints – the two Czech cases and the Polish one 
– they did it with the collaboration of their head of state. In the first Czech case the 
upper chamber as a whole filed the petition at the instigation of its European Union 
(EU) Committee, while the second petition was filed by a group of senators close to 
                                                 
7
 T. Vallinder, ‘The Judicialization of Politics – A World-wide Phenomenon: Introduction,’ (1994) 15 
International Political Science Review 91. 
8
 M. Wendel (n 4 supra), at 108. 
9
 A. Dyèvre, ‘The German Federal Constitutional Court and European Judicial Politics,’ (2011) 34 West 
European Politics 346, 354. 
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President Vaclav Klaus.10 Similarly in Poland, the petition was filed by a group of right-
wing deputies and senators11 close to President Kaczynski. 
 
Only one exception exists to this general landscape of judicialisation brought about by 
opponents of ratification: the French case. In this case, it was the head of state President 
Nicolas Sarkozy who asked the Constitutional Council to review the constitutionality of 
the Lisbon Treaty. The paradox is that President Sarkozy was not interested in blocking 
the ratification of the treaty: on the contrary, he was solemnly committed to its 
successful ratification. However, Sarkozy had not been the first French President to ask 
the Council to review the constitutionality of a European treaty; indeed, this had 
happened for every major EU treaty from Maastricht onwards.12 While Ziller explains 
the French paradox as a strategic move to avoid a more aggressive petition by 
opponents of the treaty, because sixty deputies or senators can also bring a case before 
the Council,13 we would point to the force of the tradition. Since the opinion of the 
Council had been sought by French executives for the Maastricht, Amsterdam and 
Constitutional treaties, avoiding such a petition for the Lisbon Treaty would have been 
deemed as an illegitimate break with political precedents. In other words, Sarkozy was 
bound by a largely consolidated political custom. 
 
 
B. Mobilising European clauses against ratification 
 
After the process of ratification had been judicialised, the second strategy used by 
opponents of the treaty was the mobilisation of ‘integration clauses’ for anti-ratification 
purposes. ‘European’ or ‘integration’ clauses exist in most Member States’ 
constitutions, although their content varies greatly across countries. In principle, 
European clauses have been interpreted as providing the constitutional grounding for 
each state’s membership of the EU.14 However, paradoxically, litigants in many cases 
tried to activate European clauses against the Lisbon Treaty. This happened because 
                                                 
10
 C. Closa and P. Castillo (n 6 supra). 
11
 M. Wendel (n 4 supra), at 107. 
12
 C. Closa and P. Castillo (n 6 supra). 
13
 J. Ziller, ‘The Law and Politics of the Ratification of the Lisbon Treaty,’ in S. Griller and J. Ziller (eds), 
The Lisbon Treaty. EU Constitutionalism without a constitutional treaty? (Springer, 2008), at 323. 
14
 J.E. Fossum, and A. Menéndez, The Constitution’s Gift (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2011); R.M. 
Donnarumma, ‘Intégration européenne et sauvegarde de l’identité nationale dans la jurisprudence de la 
Cour de justice et des Cours constitutionnelles,’ (2010) 84 Revue Française de Droit Constitutionnel 719. 
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European clauses, in addition to legitimating the accession and membership of the 
country to the EU, usually establish formal or substantive requirements for both the 
ratification of new European treaties and the exercise of powers by the EU. Opponents 
of ratification smartly detected this ‘reverse side of the coin’ with regard to the 
European clauses and tried to exploit it in their favour. 
 
The petitions mainly contained two kinds of allegation in this regard: they claimed 
either that powers beyond the scope permitted under the integration clause had been 
transferred to the EU or that the ratification in the country had not observed the 
procedural mandates of such a clause. With regard to the former, a good example is the 
Polish case in which claimants alleged that Article 90(1) of the Polish constitution – 
which allows for the transfer of certain powers to supranational institutions – was 
violated because such a transfer of powers in the case of the Lisbon Treaty was 
tantamount to conferring competences on other Member States that would then be able 
to impose their will on the Polish state.15 By the same token, in the Lisbon cases before 
the Czech Constitutional Court, the integration clause in Article 10a was cited to oppose 
the treaty. Article 10a states that ‘certain powers of Czech Republic authorities may be 
transferred by treaty to an international organization or institution,’ with the claimants 
considering that a conflict with such a provision could derive from the fact that the 
transferred powers were ‘not fully determinable in advance.’16 In Germany, Article 23 
of the Basic Law was also used for anti-ratification purposes. As is widely known, this 
provision is an offspring of the Solange saga17 and refers to German membership of a 
‘European Union that is committed to democratic, social and federal principles, to the 
rule of law, and to the principle of subsidiarity, and that guarantees a level of protection 
of basic rights essentially comparable to that afforded by the Basic Law.’ According to 
the claimants in the Lissabon-Urteil ruling, the capacity of the German legislature to 
democratically shape social policy was restricted by the commitment of the EU to 
engage in a competition-oriented open market economy, and thus the Lisbon Treaty was 
                                                 
15
 Polish CT, Case K 32/09 Treaty of Lisbon, judgment of 24 Nov. 2010, point I.1. 
16
 Czech CC, Case Pl ÚS 19/08 Treaty of Lisbon I, judgment of 26 Nov. 2008, paragraph 4. See a similar 
argument in the second Lisbon case: Czech CC, Case Pl ÚS 29/09 Treaty of Lisbon II, judgment of 3 
Nov. 2009, paragraph 26. 
17
 M. Claes, ‘The Europeanisation of National Constitutions in the Constitutionalisation of Europe: some 
Observations Against the Background of the Constitutional Experience of the EU-15,’ (2007) 3 Croatian 
Yearbook of European Law and Policy 1, 21. 
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contrary to the principle of the social state contained in Article 23.18 Indeed, the treaty 
was considered to transfer democratic decision-making beyond the extent permissible in 
such a provision, with the democratic principle in Article 23 thus being violated.19 
 
In relation to the mandates regarding the ratification procedure, among the rules most 
frequently utilised by claimants in their litigation were those related to the holding of a 
referendum for accession or the ratification of new EU treaties. Opponents of 
ratification tried to force an interpretation of such rules according to which ratification 
in the parliamentary arena was contrary to the constitution, whereas a referendum was 
the constitutionally appropriate manner in which to give the state’s consent to the treaty. 
The interpretation of European clauses as mandating referendum need to be understood 
in the wider frame of a general strategy of raising claims with high political legitimacy 
– in this case, consulting the demos – which will be further explored in the next 
subsection. Cases in the Czech Republic and Latvia provide good examples of this. In 
the Czech Republic, litigants tried to mobilise Article 10a, paragraph 2 of the 
constitution, which states that the ratification of a treaty transferring powers to an 
international organisation requires the consent of parliament ‘unless a constitutional act 
provides that such ratification requires the approval obtained in a referendum.’ In the 
briefs President Klaus submitted to the Czech Constitutional Court, he stated that such 
provision had to be interpreted as requiring the holding of a referendum. Although he 
had already presented this argument in the first Lisbon case,20 in the second one he 
persisted and was particularly explicit, stating that the Lisbon Treaty ‘indirectly amends 
the Accession Treaty’21 and thus the requirement for a referendum contained in Act no. 
515/2002 regarding the Accession Treaty applied analogically to the former. In Latvia, 
the European clause is found in Article 68 of the constitution, which foresees the need 
for a referendum for accession to the EU and in the event ‘of substantial changes in the 
terms regarding the membership (…) if such referendum is requested by at least one-
half of the members of the Saeima.’ According to the applicants, the latter norm and its 
legislative history ‘obliged’ parliament to submit the treaty to a referendum,22 so a 
                                                 
18
 German BVerfG, Case 2 BvE 2/08 et al. Treaty of Lisbon, judgment of 30 June 2009, paragraph 117. 
19
 ibid, paragraph 135. 
20
 Czech CC, Case Pl ÚS 19/08 Treaty of Lisbon I, judgment of 26 Nov. 2008, paragraph 27. 
21
 Czech CC, Case Pl ÚS 29/09 Treaty of Lisbon II, judgment of 3 Nov. 2009, paragraph 66. 
22
 Latvian CC, Case 2008-35-01 Treaty of Lisbon, judgment of 7 April 2009, point IV.19. 
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simple parliamentary ratification involved a violation of their rights of political 
participation contained in Article 10 of the constitution.23 
 
 
C. Raising politically evocative concerns: the claimants as guardians of 
democracy 
 
Another strategy that opponents of ratification used in the vast majority of cases was to 
present allegations that had a high political legitimacy. Claimants in general alleged that 
there was a contradiction between the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty and aspects of 
national constitutions replete with deep political and normative implications. In 
claiming that the treaty was unconstitutional, litigants focused mainly not on prosaic 
and legalistic questions, but on those which could lead to vigorous debate in the public 
sphere and evoke more intense emotions. In particular, opponents of the treaty tried to 
present themselves as defenders of democracy against anti-democratic elements of the 
process of ratification and of the content of the treaty. This is not to judge whether they 
were sincerely convinced of the fairness of their claims or not, or whether they were 
normatively right or wrong; rather the aim is simply to highlight that the claimants 
constructed their litigation strategy around such allegations. Three types of claim were 
particularly salient given their political implications: the consideration that the treaty 
had to be submitted to referendum, that its ratification threatened the protection of 
constitutional rights in the country, and the idea that it could jeopardise the role of the 
national legislature. We review these separately below. 
 
 
i. Consult the people! Requests for a ratification referendum 
 
One of the most common allegations made by the claimants referred to the need to hold 
a referendum for ratification. Such a demand has the advantage of high democratic 
credentials: by requesting a referendum, claimants could present themselves as 
defenders of democracy and the true popular will. In the previous subsection we began 
to analyse this kind of petition with regard to ‘integration clauses’. However, the 
                                                 
23
 Latvian CC, Case 2008-35-01 Treaty of Lisbon, judgment of 7 April 2009, point 2. 
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claimants were not only seeking a referendum in relation to those clauses; when other 
constitutional provisions allowed for an extensive interpretation that involved the 
holding of a referendum for ratification, litigants also included such provisions in their 
petitions. 
 
In Latvia, in addition to trying to interpret the integration clause as requiring a 
referendum, the applicants found further grounds for their claim that the people should 
be consulted, namely, Article 77 of the constitution, which foresees the need for a 
referendum in the case of an amendment of core constitutional elements. According to 
the applicants, the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty would affect Article 2 of the 
constitution – the principle of sovereignty – and thus an amendment of a core 
constitutional provision would have to be carried out before ratification could occur.24 
Claimants seem to have followed this same strategy in the first Austrian case, in which 
they alleged that the ratification of the treaty involved a total revision of the constitution 
for which a referendum was mandatory.25 In Slovenia, the need to hold a referendum on 
the Lisbon Treaty was the core claim by the applicants, who questioned not only the 
constitutionality of the Ratification Act, but also the constitutionality of the Act of 
Referendum and Public Initiative.26 Finally, in Belgium, the strategy was rather 
imaginative: claimants alleged a violation of Articles 10 and 11 of the constitution 
because parliamentary ratification had taken place in Belgium, whereas some other 
countries had held a referendum for ratification, which in their view involved undue 
discrimination against Belgian citizens. Indeed, the claimants went a step further by 
arguing that such discrimination was forbidden not only under national, but also under 
international and European law, and asked the court to make a preliminary reference to 
the Court of Justice.27 This use of EU law against the Lisbon Treaty itself may be 
considered, ironically, as proof of the success and the normalisation of the former, 
which is now regularly invoked by European citizens. 
 
 
ii. The alleged threat to constitutional rights 
 
                                                 
24
 Latvian CC, Case 2008-35-01 Treaty of Lisbon, judgment of 7 April 2009, Lisbon, point I.9. 
25
 Austrian CC, Case SV 2/08-3 et al. Treaty of Lisbon I, order of 30 Sept. 2008, point I.1. 
26
 Slovenian CC, Case Ul-49/08 Treaty of Lisbon, judgment of 17 Oct. 2008, paragraph 1. 
27
 Belgian CC, Case 58/2009 Treaty of Lisbon I, judgment of 19 March 2009, points II.A.1.1 and II.A.1.2. 
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The eventual threat that the Lisbon Treaty could pose to the protection of constitutional 
rights was also given prominence in the complaints. The protection of constitutional 
rights is one of the sources of the legitimation of modern political edifices, and one of 
the central tasks entrusted to constitutional courts. In many of these cases, the courts 
were activated through constitutional complaints, and this implies that the grounds for 
the claims were the violation of some of the complainants’ constitutional rights. 
However, in addition, some complainants considered not only that a direct violation of 
one or some of their rights existed, but that the constitutional systems designed to 
protect these rights were endangered as a whole. Using the discourse of rights against 
the ratification of the treaty seems to be a particularly incisive strategy: such discourse 
not only invests claimants with a high legitimacy, but also directly connects with the 
ethos of constitutional jurisdictions as guardians of citizens’ rights. 
 
A good example of this tactic is the German case. In this country, the complainants 
alleged that the binding effect of the Charter of Fundamental Rights would led to human 
dignity being weighed against other legal interests such as the economic fundamental 
freedoms, and that it would exempt the German state from its obligation to respect the 
fundamental rights of the Basic Law.28 It is worth noting the decades-long evolution in 
the litigants’ argument in Germany: in the ground-breaking Solange ruling the 
allegation was similar, but in that case the alleged threat was to the right to private 
property, coming from the Common Agricultural Policy. A threat to the protection of 
fundamental rights was also alleged in other countries. In Latvia, both the ratification by 
the EU of the European Convention for Human Rights and the binding force of the 
Charter of Rights were questioned. With regard to the former, the applicants indicated 
that ratification is only allowed to a state; the critiques are more interesting with regard 
to the Charter of Rights because the complainants considered it to be incompatible with 
the system of protection of constitutional rights of the Satversme – the Latvian 
constitution.29 Finally, in the Czech Lisbon I case, the Senate questioned the legal status 
of the Charter of Rights of the EU and its compatibility with the system for the 
protection of rights enshrined in the Czech constitution.30 All these allegations share 
one characteristic: instead of presuming that the new rights’ provisions of the treaty 
                                                 
28
 German BVerfG, Case 2 BvE 2/08 et al. Treaty of Lisbon, judgment of 30 June 2009, paragraph 123. 
29
 Latvian CC, Case 2008-35-01 Treaty of Lisbon, judgment of 7 April 2009, point III.18.8. 
30
 Czech CC, Case Pl ÚS 19/08 Treaty of Lisbon I, judgment of 26 Nov. 2008, paragraph 10. 
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would complement national systems for the protection of rights, claimants tried to argue 
that the latter would be now in peril. However, such an argumentation was rejected by 
the courts, as we show below. 
 
 
iii. Defending the role of national parliaments 
 
Lastly, claimants alleged that the ratification of the treaty could endanger the powers of 
the most genuine democratically elected representatives of the people, the legislative 
chambers. Perhaps the most salient example is that of Germany, in which the allegation 
about the threatened powers of the legislature is at the core of the complaint accepted by 
the court. In this case, the claim was admitted only to the extent that a violation of the 
right of the claimants under Article 38.1 of the Basic Law to a Bundestag ‘elected in 
general, direct, free, equal and secret elections’ was alleged.31 It is worth noting that in 
their petition, the claimants favoured an extensive interpretation of this provision – 
which was to a large extent accepted by the court – and which included the right to take 
part in the legitimation of state authority and to influence its exercise.32 Indeed, 
grounding their petition in Article 38.1, the claimants alleged inter alia violations of the 
Basic Law for the loss of German statehood,33 the contravention of the principle of the 
rule of law,34 and the infringement of the principle of separation of powers.35 Given the 
core role of Article 38.1 in the complaint, it is not surprising that the ruling largely 
reflected upon the powers of the German legislature under the framework of the new 
treaty and even requested a legislative amendment to better accommodate the 
Bundestag and Bundesrat in such a framework. 
 
Although this topic had a special salience in Germany, it was also present in other 
complaints. In Latvia, concerns about the powers of the national legislatures were 
framed within wider fears regarding democracy in the EU, which it was argued would 
become weaker after the entry into force of the treaty; in particular, ‘a democratic 
deficit is increased with the amendment procedure for founding European treaties, 
                                                 
31
 German BVerfG, Case 2 BvE 2/08 et al. Treaty of Lisbon, judgment of 30 June 2009, paragraph 168. 
32
 ibid, paragraph 100. 
33
 ibid, paragraph 110. 
34
 ibid, paragraph 115. 
35
 ibid, paragraph 118. 
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which allows the bypass of national Parliaments.’36 In Poland, the complaint was to 
some extent authoritative because it came from a group of Senators who expressed 
concerns about the role of the legislative chamber, as the Polish Constitutional Court 
recognised in its statement that ‘The application reflects the fears of the Senators that 
the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty will undermine the strong position of the national 
legislative branch.’37 Similarly in the first Czech case  the Senate put forward the 
capacity of the sector Council to include further areas of criminal activity in the sphere 
of EU regulation without any room for national parliaments to disagree and asked 
‘whether this does not de facto render Article 15 par.1 of the Constitution meaningless 
(“the legislative power of the Czech Republic is vested in the Parliament”).’38 Finally, 
in Belgium the moves in defence of the national legislature acquired idiosyncratic 
characteristics associated with one of the most defining characteristics of the country: its 
federal nature. While the first claim alleged that a violation of the rights of the federal 
and regional parliaments derived from the fact that the treaty had been ratified without 
such chambers having reached an agreement on the execution of the ‘Protocol on the 
application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality,’39 the second petition 
went further and claimed that the Lisbon Treaty would bring about major constitutional 
changes in Member States so that in Belgium the share of competences between federal 
and regional parliaments would be altered and thus the Belgian ‘démocratie multiple’ 
would become impossible.40 In summary, claimants pretended to act as defenders of the 
organs of national representative democracy, using arguments that tried to exploit the 
‘democratic deficit’ discourse. 
 
 
D. Exploiting the tensions in the European judicial dialogue 
 
Finally, on some occasions, claimants seem to have been aware of the tensions between 
national constitutional jurisdictions and the Court of Justice, which had materialised in 
the doctrine Kompetenz-Kompetenz (the competence to determine the scope of 
competences), and tried to exploit them for their own benefit. 
                                                 
36
 Latvian CC, Case 2008-35-01 Treaty of Lisbon, judgment of 7 April 2009, point 2. 
37
 Polish CT, Case K 32/09 Treaty of Lisbon, judgment of 24 Nov. 2010, point III.4.1. 
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As is well known, one of the most salient aspects of the European judicial dialogue has 
been the conflict around the possibility for national courts to review EU secondary law 
in order to protect core constitutional provisions. The doctrine of the Court of Justice is 
clear in this regard. On the one hand, according to the principle of primacy, EU 
secondary law enjoys precedence over national law in cases of conflict41; on the other 
hand, the Court of Justice considers that a review of the validity of a rule of EU law is 
within its exclusive competence.42 However, some national constitutional jurisdictions 
have revolted against this interpretation of the relationship between European and 
national law. The German Constitutional Court, in its Solange I decision, considered 
that as long as the EU did not ensure a level of protection of fundamental rights 
equivalent to that of the German Basic Law, it was its duty to enforce the constitutional 
rights of German citizens even against European secondary law.43 Furthermore, in its 
Maastricht-Urteil decision, the German court threatened to declare unconstitutional 
European secondary law adopted ultra vires, that is to say, enacted beyond the scope of 
powers transferred to the EU by Member States.44 What has been called a ‘judicial 
dialogue’ is simply an arm-wrestle between the Court of Justice and national 
constitutional courts each seek to delimit the other’s respective powers. As stated by 
Stone Sweet, national constitutional courts seem to have had ‘good reasons to resist the 
development of a European “constitutional” order that might subsume the national 
order.’45 
 
Claimants tried to exploit this tension for their own benefit by providing an argument 
against the treaty based in the courts’ own interest. Although almost all petitions 
included points that could directly or indirectly have driven the courts to approach the 
question of their Kompetenz-Kompetenz, three were particularly explicit: the German, 
the Polish and the second Czech petitions. In Germany, surely aware of the previous 
case law of Karlsruhe, the claimants argued that the treaty would include the de facto 
‘unrestricted primacy’ of European law over national law, which would deprive the 
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German court of its capacity to examine compliance with the principle of conferral and 
to ensure the safeguarding of Germany’s constitutional identity and protection of 
constitutional rights.46 In Poland, the claimants challenged the conformity of 
Declaration No. 17, which states the principle of primacy of EU law, to constitutional 
provisions in Article 8 which state that: ‘The Constitution shall be the supreme law of 
the Republic of Poland’ and in Articles 91(2) and (3) as well as in Article 195(1) which 
state that: ‘judges of the Constitutional Tribunal (…) shall be independent and subject 
only to the Polish Constitution.’47 Finally, in the Czech Lisbon II ruling, the petitioners 
were especially explicit and gave the Czech Constitutional Court a golden opportunity 
to give its ‘final word’ on the constitutionality of EU secondary law. During the 
hearings, the petitioners claimed that Article 19(1) of the treaty made the Court of 
Justice ‘superior in interpretation of the “Treaties” to the Constitutional Court of the 
Czech Republic.’ They argued that the ‘interpretation of any supplements or 
amendments to the Treaty of Lisbon by the Court of Justice will have priority over 
interpretation of them by the constitutional court of an EU Member State.’48 It is 
interesting to note how sometimes the claimants were rather explicit in presenting the 
situation as a power struggle between the Court of Justice and national constitutional 
jurisdictions. 
 
 
 
III. The Pro-ratification courts: the responses of the constitutional 
jurisdictions 
 
The response by courts to the above mentioned moves by the claimants was clear: they 
were not going to be the standard bearers of the opponents of ratification. The courts 
refrained from becoming a tool in the hands of the petitioners. For those rulings that 
entered into the merits of the cases, every strategy put forward by the claimants seems 
to have elicited a pro-ratification reaction from the national courts, even if some 
institutions such as the French or Belgian had a rather concise style of doing so. Firstly, 
opponents of the treaty sought to judicialise the process of ratification, but the courts 
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never gave them what they really wanted: a declaration of unconstitutionality. Secondly, 
while claimants emphasised the most restrictive aspects of the ‘integration clauses,’ the 
courts favoured a pro-integration reading of them. Third, the courts addressed the 
politically evocative points raised by the complainants by counter-arguing that the treaty 
reinforced the democratic elements at stake. Fourthly, the concerns about the 
compatibility between the treaty and the constitution were redirected towards the 
statement of the famous doctrine of Kompetenz-Kompetenz. We review these four types 
of responses below. 
 
 
A. One ‘Crotty’ was enough: facilitating ratification 
 
In judicialising the processes of ratification claimants sought to slow them down or 
block them. In general, the ‘Crotty’ case seems to have played an important role as a 
precedent for the opponents of ratification. As is well known, in Crotty v. An 
Taoiseach,49 an opponent of the ratification of the Single European Act brought the 
treaty before the Irish Supreme Court for a review of its constitutionality. Mr Raymond 
Crotty’s strategy was partially successful when, after a three against two vote of the 
plenary of the court, the treaty was found unconstitutional. Under such circumstances, 
in order to proceed with ratification, a constitutional amendment, involving a 
referendum, had to be carried out.50 Although the reform of the constitution was passed 
by the Irish people and hence the Single European Act could finally be ratified, the 
ruling was a partial victory for the claimant because the case delayed ratification, forced 
political elites to consult the people, and gave rise to a constitutional tradition in Ireland 
according to which a referendum for constitutional amendment had to be held before 
every major European treaty ratification. The case can be seen as a successful example 
of the judicialisation of the processes of treaty ratification and, consequently, it is not 
surprising that during the process of ratification of the Lisbon Treaty other claimants 
tried to follow a ‘Crotty strategy,’ by asking the courts to review the treaty while in 
many cases alleging that a referendum for ratification had to take place. 
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However, such a strategy was systematically curbed by courts. In all the other cases, the 
courts seem to have been aware of the consequences of a declaration of 
unconstitutionality and avoided such statements.51 Indeed, the ‘nuclear option’ to 
declare treaties contrary to the constitution could be argued to have direct costs with 
regard to the status of constitutional courts as key stakeholders in European judicial 
politics52. Only the French Constitutional Council dared to declare the treaty 
unconstitutional. Curiously enough, the French case is the only one initiated by a pro-
ratification head of state, instead of by citizens or MPs who were opponents of 
ratification. According to Closa the explanation for this French exception to the rule is 
that, unlike in other countries, in France a constitutional amendment would have been 
politically costless and feasible, and hence a declaration of unconstitutionality would 
have been harmless.53 Indeed, Article 89 of the French constitution allows the President 
of the Republic to opt between seeking a constitutional amendment through a 
referendum or through a joint session of the legislative chambers if a threshold of two-
thirds is reached. However, a complementary explanation of the French case may be 
offered. Before the Lisbon Treaty, the French Constitutional Council had assessed the 
constitutionality of the Maastricht, Amsterdam and Constitutional Treaties, and had 
always concluded that constitutional amendment was necessary before ratification. The 
Council had created the doctrine of the ‘essential conditions of the exercise of national 
sovereignty,’54 which was systematically used to declare the most novel aspects of the 
treaties to be contrary to the constitution. Consequently, Article 88 of the French 
constitution has undergone frequent amendments, so its evolution mirrors the very 
evolution of the EU and the series of treaties ratified by France. The analogical 
application of such a doctrine to the new provisions of the Lisbon Treaty led to the 
conclusion that again a constitutional amendment was necessary. In this regard, the 
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French Constitutional Council seems to have been bound by its very doctrine and the 
precedents of other treaties. 
 
However, when the complainants were opponents of ratification, the courts always 
avoided satisfying their pretensions and never declared the Lisbon Treaty to be 
unconstitutional. In some cases, petitions were rejected on formal grounds, so the courts 
did not even enter into the merits of the cases. Indeed, the Austrian Constitutional Court 
did this twice; in its Lisbon I ruling of 30 September 2008 it stated that under Article 
140 of the Austrian constitution a treaty still unpublished in the Federal Law Gazette 
could not be an object of the review of the court, while in its Lisbon II ruling of 11 
March 2009 it stated that the petitioners had not sufficiently established any direct and 
personal violation of rights. In Slovenia, the situation was similar to that of the second 
Austrian case; Article 25 of the Slovenian constitution states that: ‘Everyone shall be 
guaranteed the right to appeal or to any other legal remedy against the decisions of 
courts and other state authorities, local community authorities and bearers of public 
authority by which his rights, duties or legal interests are determined’. However, the 
Slovenian court considered that the requirement of the final part of the Article, the 
existence of a direct link with the claimants’ rights, duties or legal interests had not been 
sufficiently proven. Finally, in Belgium, after twice reviewing the constitutionality of 
the Lisbon Treaty, the Belgian Constitutional Court dismissed on formal grounds the 
third suit against the treaty. The grounds for such a decision lay in Article 3(2) of the 
statute of the court – loi spéciale du 6 janvier 1989 – which states that the claims based 
on Article 134 of the constitution for the annulment of laws have to be presented within 
sixty days of their publication, a requirement which the claimants did not fulfil. In these 
four cases, rejection of the petition on formal grounds prevented the court from entering 
into the merits of the case, and thus the possibility of an uncomfortable declaration of 
unconstitutionality was avoided, although this meant that the courts lost the chance to 
enter into the wider European judicial dialogue that had been created around the 
assessment of the treaty. 
 
Lastly, it is important to note that, in the majority of cases, the outcome of the 
proceedings was in fact a declaration of constitutionality. In declaring the Lisbon Treaty 
constitutional, the courts emphasised that there existed a general constitutional openness 
to integration and, at the same time, they concluded that the substantive allegations of 
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the claimants did not sufficiently justify a declaration that the treaty was 
unconstitutional. We look at this aspect next. 
 
B. Emphasising openness to integration: European clauses as 
interpreted by national courts 
 
The role of the European clauses for ratification was controversial. In relation to the 
Lisbon Treaty, claimants emphasised their most restrictive aspects and forced an 
interpretation that would enable their integration into an anti-ratification strategy. 
However, the courts took an opposite view, favouring a reading of European clauses 
that saw them as serving to open up internal legal systems to supranational integration. 
 
In its Lisbon ruling, Karlsruhe opted for a pro-integration interpretation of the interplay 
between the preamble of the constitution and Article 23, and recognised that: ‘The 
German Constitution is directed towards opening the sovereign state order to peaceful 
cooperation of the nations and towards European integration’55. Here, the Federal 
Constitutional Court was indeed following the doctrine which considers Article 23 to be 
‘a constitutional commitment to European integration.’56 In France, integration 
provisions are mentioned among the ‘reference rules’ of the assessment, particularly the 
Preamble of the Constitution of 1946 and Article 88-1 of the current French 
constitution, which the Council interpreted as allowing ‘France to participate in the 
creation and development of a permanent European organization.’57 Similarly, the 
Czech Constitutional Court found that Article 10a, paragraph 1 of the constitution 
provided the legal grounding for the transfer of powers to international organisations, 
even though the court limited the scope of such a transfer by stating that ‘only certain 
powers’58 could be transferred. Overall, as Ruffer states, ‘the [Czech] Court again 
subscribed to the principle of a Euro-conforming interpretation of the Czech 
constitutional law.’59 Other courts were less wordy in their references to European 
                                                 
55
 German BVerfG, Case 2 BvE 2/08 et al. Treaty of Lisbon, judgment of 30 June 2009, paragraph 219. 
56
 D. Chalmers, ‘A Few Thoughts on the Lisbon Judgement,’ in A. Fischer-Lescano, C. Georges and A. 
Wonka (eds) The German Constitutional Court’s Lisbon Ruling: Legal and Political Science Perspectives 
(ZERP Diskussionpapier 1/2010, 2010), online at 
http://www.mpifg.de/people/mh/paper/ZERP%20Discussion%20Paper%201.2010.pdf (01.04.2012), 5. 
57
 French CC, Case 2007-560 DC Treaty of Lisbon, decision of 20 Dec. 2007, paragraph 8. 
58
 Czech Constitutional Court, decision (Lisbon I), paragraph 97. 
59
 E. Ruffer, ‘The quest of the Lisbon Treaty in the Czech Republic and some of the changes it introduces 
in EU primary law,’ (2010) 1 Czech Yearbook of International Law 33. 
 19 
clauses. In Poland, to give one last example, the Constitutional Court recognised that 
consent to the Lisbon Treaty had been granted by a statute enacted in accordance with 
the requirements specified in Article 90 of the constitution.60 It is surprising, though, 
that the two courts that most emphasised openness to European integration of their 
national constitution, the German and Czech, were at the same time the most insistent 
on the notion that the transfer of powers to the EU should not be unlimited and that the 
Kompetenz-Kompetenz should remain with national institutions (see subsection III.D). 
Thus European clauses, even if interpreted in a pro-integration manner, were not seen as 
equivalent to a carte blanche for European authorities. 
 
In addition to asserting the constitutional commitment to the EU incorporated in 
integration clauses, the courts rejected the argument that certain provisions in such 
clauses could be used to declare Lisbon unconstitutional. Although the Polish 
Constitutional Court recognised that Article 90 of the constitution was not tantamount 
to allowing the possibility to confer all competences of a given organ of the state or in a 
given field,61 it considered that the transfer of competences as fulfilled by a statute 
complied with the requirements of such a provision62. In addition, the Polish 
Constitutional Court stated on a number of occasions that a referendum for the transfer 
of new powers included in Article 90 was not mandatory, but rather should be seen as 
providing for an alternative to parliamentary ratification of the treaty.63 This 
interpretation seems to be shared by some scholars.64 The Latvian Constitutional Court 
also contested the idea that Article 68(4) of the constitution obliged parliament to 
submit the ratification of the treaty to a referendum and, following different 
hermeneutical methods, considered that submitting the treaty to a referendum was only 
a right – not a duty – of MPs, which they should exercise taking into account 
considerations of political utility.65 Finally, the Czech Constitutional Court did the same 
with regards to the claims in relation to Article 10a of the constitution, concluding that a 
referendum for ratification ‘was not obligatory.’66 The courts thus rejected the 
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restrictive interpretations of European clauses that the claimants had proposed and 
instead underlined their most pro-ratification aspects. 
 
 
C. Placating democratic concerns: an optimistic reading of the Lisbon 
Treaty 
 
Together with anti-ratification interpretations of European clauses, claimants used 
another strategy: alleging that the treaty infringed constitutional principles with deep 
political ramifications. The courts seem to have been pleased to address these concerns. 
In general, courts’ rulings were verbose with plenty of normative reflections on 
constitutional and political principles. However, unlike the claimants, their discourse 
was rather conciliatory with respect to the Lisbon Treaty. Only the German Federal 
Constitutional Court opted for a more critical discourse, although even in this case the 
treaty was found to be compatible with the German constitution and its core principles. 
 
 
i. Referendums are not necessary 
 
As we have shown, referendums were sought by the claimants many times, probably 
following the example of the ‘Crotty’ ruling, but the constitutional courts systematically 
rejected the petitions to carry out a referendum on the ratification of the treaty. As we 
have also seen, the courts dismissed the petitions for a referendum that were based on 
European clauses, and they did the same when petitions were grounded on other 
constitutional provisions. 
 
In Belgium, the applicants alleged that undue discrimination against Belgian citizens 
derived from the fact that, unlike in some other Member States, a referendum for 
ratification had not taken place in the country. This allegation was dismissed by the 
Belgian court, which considered the procedure of ratification to be legitimately 
governed by the constitutional order of each Member State.67 In Latvia, the 
Constitutional Court carried out a thorough review of the treaty in order to assess 
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whether it infringed Article 2 of the constitution and if a referendum for amendment 
should therefore be held, After the review of a large list of substantive aspects of the 
treaty – to which the court devoted the whole of section III of the ruling – it concluded 
that the principle of sovereignty of the people had not been infringed by the ratification 
of the treaty and hence a referendum according to Article 77 was not necessary.68 
Finally, in some cases – such as the Austrian and Slovenian – the courts rejected the 
claims on procedural grounds and hence did not even have to give a substantive answer 
to the question. In summary, with a ‘responsible’ attitude, the courts rejected the 
interpretations of the claimants that a referendum was constitutionally required. Thus, 
the general pattern points to the courts preferring to avoid plebiscites. 
 
 
ii. Constitutional rights are safe 
 
Alleged violations of constitutional rights were also dismissed. In this sense, as we 
outlined earlier, the alleged violations of applicants’ rights on which the constitutional 
complaints were based were always dismissed by the courts: only the ruling by the 
French Constitutional Council resulted in a declaration of unconstitutionality; however, 
the case was not a constitutional complaint but rather related to a procedure to control of 
the treaty in abstracto. Hence in this case the grounds for the declaration of 
unconstitutionality were unrelated to the systems for the protection of fundamental 
rights. 
 
More interestingly, with regards to the alleged generic threats to the national systems 
for the protection of rights, the courts tried to emphasise compatibility between the 
national and European systems. Curiously enough, the usually prolix German court 
dismissed summarily the alleged threat to constitutional rights posed by the Charter of 
Rights on the grounds that the applicant had not sufficiently substantiated a violation of 
his fundamental rights in relation to such an allegation.69 Moreover, with its usual 
laconic phrasing, the French Constitutional Council reviewed the question and 
concluded that the Charter of Rights did not require constitutional amendment prior to 
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ratification,70 although it considered that if the Union joined the European Convention 
for Human Rights, authorisation by the French parliament would be necessary.71 Other 
courts provided more elaborate answers on the question. In the Czech Lisbon I case, the 
court considered that, in contrast to the suggestion by the Senate, the Charter of Rights 
did not illegitimately expand the powers of the EU. However, in addition, it underlined 
that under EU law the Charter had to be interpreted in harmony with the constitutional 
traditions common in the Member States, thereby minimising the risk of conflict.72 The 
same approach was taken by the Latvian Constitutional Court, which insisted that the 
standards of rights of the European Convention and of the Charter of Rights were 
compatible with those in national constitutions because they were based on the same 
values and principles.73 The courts therefore argued against the pessimistic views of the 
claimants, taking instead an optimistic view in which the Lisbon Treaty not only did not 
contradict the national system for the protection of constitutional rights, but indeed 
complemented it. The courts subverted the critical discourse of the opponents of 
ratification and made the prestige of constitutional rights play in favour of the treaty: 
not only was the Lisbon Treaty not a threat to constitutional rights, it was a new 
guarantor of those rights. 
 
 
iii. The Lisbon Treaty does not threaten national parliaments 
 
Threats to the role of national parliaments were alleged in a number of cases. In this 
regard, there are certain differences between the approach of the majority of the courts 
and that of the German court. In general, the courts emphasised the increase in the role 
of national parliaments.74 In France, the Constitutional Council devotes five paragraphs 
to listing the new powers of the French legislature, after having recognised that the 
Lisbon Treaty ‘increases the participation of national parliaments in the activities of the 
European Union.’75 The Polish Constitutional Court also highlighted the extension in 
the powers of the Polish legislature deriving from the Protocol on the role of national 
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parliaments in the EU.76 In Latvia, although it was not as categorical as some of its 
counterparts, the Constitutional Court also enumerated some of the new powers 
attributed to national legislatures by the treaty, for instance in the application of the 
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality77 and in the framework of the simplified 
revision procedures.78 Also, the Czech Constitutional Court enlisted the new powers 
granted to national parliaments by the treaty to reach the conclusion that ‘the Treaty of 
Lisbon reserves an important role to the domestic parliaments.’79 Finally, in Belgium, 
the court dismissed concerns regarding the loss of powers of regional parliaments in its 
two rulings using the same argument in each case: the lack of prior agreement between 
the federal and regional parliaments did not affect the validity of the act of ratification 
of the treaty80. Unlike other institutions and following its own general style, the Belgian 
court did not devote much reasoning to the question, despite it being a politically 
sensitive topic. In general, again, the courts opted for a positive reading of the Lisbon 
Treaty and argued that it did not pose a threat to the role of national parliaments. On the 
contrary, the courts argued that it would reinforce the position of the legislatures – with 
all the implications of such an interpretation leaning towards a consequent increase in 
democratic legitimacy. 
 
The only case in which a court appreciated that there could be a partial threat to the 
powers of the national legislature was that of Germany. Karlsruhe stands above the rest 
as the most mistrustful of the courts we have discussed herein. The court admitted the 
claim on the grounds that the rights of the complainant under Article 38.1 of the 
constitution could be violated by the treaty on the understanding that such provision 
included the right to a democratically elected parliament. Although the court finally 
considered that the Lisbon Treaty did not infringe Article 38 of the Basic Law, it found 
that the Act Extending and Strengthening the Rights of the Bundestag and the Bundesrat 
in European Union Matters did do so, in so far as the rights of the legislative chambers 
had not been sufficiently developed. According to Lock, introducing a hurdle at the 
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national level to prevent the erosion of national competences was the alternative to 
declaring that the treaty was unconstitutional.81 
 
 
D. The ultimate guarantee of the constitutional order: constitutional 
jurisdictions as ultima ratio 
 
As stated by Closa, ‘an attractive alternative to demanding constitutional reform is the 
use of legal reasoning to identify clear limits and conditions that may not be breached in 
the future.’82 National courts seem to have redirected certain concerns of the claimants 
such as respect for national sovereignty or the constitutional identity towards the 
doctrine of Kompetenz-Kompetenz: although the treaty could be ratified, the courts 
would act in the future as ultimate guarantors of the core elements of the constitution. 
Thus the doctrine was at the same time a response to the petitions and a tool  used by 
courtsto empower themselves vis-à-vis the European Court. The general idea was that 
the primacy of EU law was not unlimited, and that constitutional jurisdictions would act 
as an ultimate safeguard of core constitutional provisions. This could be considered a 
partial victory of claimants, who had contributed with their petitions to the shaping of 
the relationship between EU law and national constitutional law. 
 
The German court was rather clear in stating that the Lisbon Treaty did not confer 
primacy over the constitutional identity of the Member States, which in the case of a 
conflict of laws was protected in Germany by the identity review pursuant to Article 
23.1 in conjunction with Article 79.3 of the Basic Law83. The importance given to the 
concept of ‘constitutional identity’ has probably been one of the most salient features of 
the wave of judicial cases on the Lisbon Treaty. In addition, Karlsruhe stressed that in 
its Maastricht ruling it had already stated that it would review whether the legal 
instruments of the European institutions remained within the limits of the sovereign 
powers conferred on them.84 By the same token, and with an explicit reference to its 
German counterpart, the Czech court stated that it remained the supreme protector of the 
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Czech constitution, even ‘against possible excesses by European Union bodies’85. 
However, curiously enough, when in the second complaint the Czech court was 
explicitly asked about this question, it preferred to water down its approach and to 
restate that possible conflicts between European and constitutional law could also be 
solved by means of a constitutional amendment.86 Finally, slightly less boldly, the 
Polish87 and Latvian88 rulings also approached the question, although they stated that 
they would consider whether to make an exception to the primacy of European law only 
where real – and not hypothetical – conflicts between European law and their 
constitutions arose. It is worth noting that in none of these cases in which Kompetenz-
Kompetenz was stated was the treaty found to be unconstitutional. On the contrary, the 
only ruling that resulted in a declaration of unconstitutionality, that of the French 
Council, did not contain a statement of Kompetenz-Kompetenz. 
 
 
IV. Conclusions 
 
Opponents of ratification showed that they had understood that in order to contest the 
treaty before a court they had to respect the rules that govern the judicial arena, and so 
they played their political game the judicial way. In so doing, they developed a 
multitude of strategies in order to persuade the courts with legal arguments that the 
treaty, or its act of ratification, should be declared contrary to the constitution. However, 
the courts seem to have been aware of the political consequences that a declaration of 
unconstitutionality could have for the ratification of the treaty, and every move by the 
claimants was met by a judicial counter-strategy. At the end of the day, the claimants 
seem to have felt a certain sense of frustration, which became visible in the petition in 
the Lisbon II case in the Czech Republic: 
 
The petitioners cannot rid themselves of the impression that the 
Constitutional Court, in reviewing the conformity of the Treaty of Lisbon 
with the constitutional order, was always heretofore, in the case of any 
doubts, more on the side of the Lisbon Treaty than on the side of the 
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constitutional order. The Constitutional Court has a considerable degree of 
discretion in interpretation, and unfortunately the Constitutional Court’s 
efforts to proceed intentionally so that the Treaty of Lisbon could be declared 
not to contravene the constitutional order cannot be denied.89 
 
 
The discourse by the claimants and of the courts highlight the different facets of the 
cases. The claimants judicialised the process of ratification with arguments that the 
Lisbon Treaty exceeded the potential for the transfer of powers foreseen by the national 
integration clauses and that the democratic credentials of the treaty were dubious: the 
people had not been consulted about the ratification of a treaty that could endanger the 
protection of constitutional rights and the role of legislative assemblies in the country. 
For the courts, however, the ratification of the treaty was simply the expression of a 
constitutional commitment to integration; indeed, for constitutional jurisdictions the 
ratification reinforced the standards for the protection of rights and expanded the powers 
of the national parliaments. Only two institutions dared to diverge slightly from this 
general pattern: the French Constitutional Council with its harmless declaration of 
unconstitutionality and the German Federal Constitutional Court with its challenging 
declaration of constitutionality.90 
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